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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
separate existence from that of the sole owner of all its stock, then the
debt is still owing to the estate of the testatrix. If on the other hand, the
corporate fiction is to be disregarded, then the corporation and the nephew
are one and the same and the debt is no longer owing.
The decision of the court seems well founded both on logic and authority.
In its words: "The value of the capital stock of the Service Laundry Com-
pany as an asset of L. E. Williams at the date of the death of the testatrix
was directly and proportionately affected by the amount of the note held
by Mrs. Henson, and if the effect of the will is to release the corporation
from the obligation to pay the note, the value of the capital stock owned
by L. E. Williams will be directly and proportionately enhanced in value
thereby. The personal wealth of L. E. 'Williams will be increased to the
same extent, by the cancellation of this note as if it had been a note exe-
cuted by him individually and constituting his personal obligation."
M. E. S., '31.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-DECLARATION OF QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDI-
DATES FOR OFFICE.-In a recent Kentucky decision applicants seeking a dec-
laration of disqualification of certain candidates for city offices for corrupt
practices, were refused a declaratory judgment, the court holding that they
were not entitled to it under the provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act
(Civ. Code Prac. sec. 639a-1, 2) which authorized a declaration of the
rights and duties of a person or persons in certain situations, though no
consequential or other relief were asked for, piovided that an actual con-
troversy existed. The decision was based on the lack of such controversy.
Dietz et al. v. Ziminer et al. (Ky. 1929) 21 S. W. (2d) 999.
There can be no doubt that the declaratory judgment fills a long-felt need
in American jurisprudence. The great economic burden involved in the de-
termination of legal relations arises not only from the slowness of movement
of the machinery of the courts once a controversy has been submitted to
them, but also, and more directly, from the necessity for the commission of
a wrong and the invasion of a right, with consequent damage, before the
courts have jurisdiction over the situation. The efficacy of the declaratory
judgment as a means of preventive justice, its usefulness in removing uncer-
tainty from legal relationships, forces daily its more widespread recognition
and application. It has been used, pursuant to statutes, in connection with
the construction and validity of wills, contracts, leases, and insurance pol-
icies; to declare the marital status of individuals; to decide title to real and
personal property, and to adjudicate existence or non-existence of easements.
However, it is not applied to moot cases, in which no existing rights are
concerned; nor is it used in a merely advisory capacity as an expression of
the law and applied to certain facts not necessarily in dispute. Hoard V.
Jordan (1919) 23 Ga. App. 656, 99 S. E. 144; Kelly v. Jackson (1925) 206
Ky. 815, 268 S. W. 815; Yates v. Beaseley (1923) 133 Miss. 30, 97 So. 676.
It is apparent that the present case presented no such controversy. The
plaintiffs were voters, seeking merely to have certain of the defendants dis-
qualified as candidates and certain other defendants given the right to ap-
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pear as candidates in their places. The decision is in accord with the prin-
ciple enunciated in State v. Circuit Court of Marathon County (1922) 178
Wis. 468, 190 N. W. 563. In that case the question in issue was whether
the court could enjoin the county clerks from placing on the official ballot the
name of a regularly nominated candidate for state senator on the ground
that he was ineligible. It was held that the eligibility of a nominee to office
could not be judicially determined until after election, even though non-
eligibility were plainly disclosed. Prior to an election voters have no inter-
est in the eligibility of candidates which entitles them to file any sort of
action. P. S. A., '31.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-AUTHORITY OF WIFE TO PLEDGE CREDIT OF HUS-
BAND.-In a suit by a mercantile establishment against defendant whose
wife was furnished by him with ample means to pay cash for articles of
clothing, it was held that the wife was without right to purchase a fur
coat on her husband's credit and that the husband was entirely absolved
from liability. Saks v. Huddleston et ux. (D. C. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 537.
The decision undoubtedly follows the almost universal holding. MeCreery
and Co. v. Martin (1913) 84 N. J. L. 626, 87 Atl. 433; Wickstrom V. Peck
(1914) 136 App. Div. 608, 148 N. Y. S. 596; Eder v. Grifka (1912) 149
Wis. 606, 136 N. W. 154. The leading case of Wanamaker v. Weaver
(1903) 176 N. Y. 75, 68 N. E. 135, enunciated the theory that marriage and co-
habitation do not constitute a holding out of the wife as an agent to purchase
necessaries. Although a presumption of such agency may exist, it is only
prima facie, and may be rebutted by proof that the husband either fur-
nished the necessaries himself or gave the wife ample allowance. It is true
that some early English cases held a ontra view, chiefly expressed in dicta,
as in Johnson v. Sumner (1858) 3 Hurlst. & N. 261, 157 Eng. R. 469, but
the modern doctrine is in accord with the principal case. Morel Bros. V.
Westm reland (1903) 1 K. B. 64; note (1903) 65 L. R. A. 529, 542.
In the principal case the court, after citing authority, thus justifies its
decision: "Its tendency will be to check extravagance (one of the most
pronounced of modern evils), and at the same time protect husbands, who
in good faith have made such provision for their wives as their means and
station in life warranted, from debts thoughtlessly and needlessly con-
tracted, and often beyond the capacity of the husband to pay." And as to
the merchant, "The present-day means available to merchants for the
ascertainment of the moral and financial responsibility of patrons and
customers are such that little apprehension need be indulged on account of
the rule we have just announced."
In view of the imposing array of authority it is with some hesitation
that one ventures the criticism that the doctrine is not one well adapted to
modern usage. Unfortunately the mercantile practice is not what the
courts wish or think it to be, and apparently it will not be changed. In the
city of St. Louis, as disclosed by the credit department of a large depart-
ment store, it is the practice not to question the wife's authority when she
opens an account in her husband's name. It is found to be embarrassing,
often to the point of losing trade, to ask too many questions. The princi-
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